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Abstract
This article intends to offer a methodological clarification of Foucault’s genealogy 
in relation to judicial practice, with the aim to apply it to judicial governance. In par-
ticular, it shows that beyond the distinctive questions of the debate on government 
by judges (creation of law and democratic legitimacy), a specific form of judicial gov-
ernmentality has been created since 19th century, through the complex relationship 
of judiciary with technologies of power and forms of knowledge. The article tries 
to demonstrate that the problem of the government by judges can be rewritten and 
that judicial governance constitutes a new chapter of the judicial governmentality, a 
form of governmentality that makes the expertising the result of our legal and moral 
history. 
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Resumen
Este artículo pretende aclarar metodológicamente la genealogía de Foucault en re-
lación con la práctica judicial, con la finalidad de aplicarla a la gobernanza judicial. En 
particular, se pretende mostrar que, más allá de las clásicas problemáticas del debate 
sobre el gobierno de los jueces (creación de derecho y legitimación democrática), desde 
hace el siglo XIX se creó una forma específica de gubernamentalidad judicial, gracias 
a una compleja relación de lo judicial con tecnologías de poder y formas de saber. El 
artículo intenta demostrar que el problema del gobierno de los jueces se puede volver a 
escribir y que la gobernanza judicial constituye un nuevo capítulo de la gubernamenta-
lidad judicial, una forma de gubernamentalidad que convierte el expertising en el resul-
tado de nuestra historia jurídica y moral.  
Palabras clave
Michel Foucault, gobernanza judicial, gubernamentalidad judicial, globalización 
jurídica.
The Judicial Power in Foucauldian Method 
Since the debate on the global expansion of judicial power has exploded, towards 
the end of the 20th century, a wide literature has attempted to grasp its most significant 
aspects, also by reactivating old categories (government of judges), or inventing new 
ones (judicial governance).1 With this study we would like to add some considerations 
to the debate by emphasizing the capability of social regulation exercised by judges 
in a complex field of governmentality. And we would like to do this through Michel 
Foucault’s methodology, because we believe that judicial governmentality is a field in 
which his thought may express its hermeneutic power. An analysis which starts from 
Foucault’s categories requires, however, a preliminary determination of the method-
ological core through which Foucault considered transformations of the judicial power. 
Therefore, the Foucault’s method will be synthetically illustrated and then we will show 
1. See at least C. N. Tate, T. Vallinder (eds.), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power, New York University Press, New 
York-London, 1995; S. Brondel, N. Foulquier, L. Heuschling (eds.), Gouvernement des juges et démocratie, Publications de 
la Sorbonne, Paris, 2001; M. Shapiro, A. Stone Sweet (eds.), On Law, Politics and Judicialization, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2002.
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through some examples how the judicial power was and is still part of a governmental 
device that has contributed in production of social order through its function of part-
age, which today is quantitatively and qualitatively changed.
On different occasions Foucault underlined the importance of law for the creation 
of our forms of experience.2 This interest was made concrete in a series of analyses in 
which we believe a constant methodological core can be found, according to which the 
space of the trial is one of the places in which the strategic game which might prelude 
to a possible re-articulation of a regime of truth is decided and that can be inscribed, 
in short, in the “games of truth and error through which being is historically consti-
tuted as experience”.3 From the Foucauldian point of view, judgment is ‘populated’ by 
different forces whose genesis needs to be investigated, which make judgment a pièce 
in the dramaturgy of the real. That means, in short, that judgment and trial are a sort 
of litmus test for understanding the changes of the juridical and moral experience and 
them political consistency.4 
Judicial practices are made up of what Foucault called moral technologies, a concept 
involving the political technology of the body, the technologies of truth, the political 
technology of individuals, the technologies of the self, etc. In a certain circumstance 
Foucault defined the concept of governmentality like the interdependence between 
these technologies5, and in another one he explained that each correlation system be-
tween these technologies is qualified by the dominant technology6, with its rules, knowl-
edge and forms of subjectivity.7 Indeed, the character of these technologies is in their 
being matrixes of practical reason. Their value is not ontological, but genealogical and 
strategic: they are the object of movements and re-uses which give them an importance 
which from time to time differs within the system in which they are used. The condi-
tions which make one practice or another socially acceptable and legitimate in a given 
historical period are, for Foucault, an autonomous field of research because of their 
regularity, of their “reason” — a word which, for Foucault, does not refer to the extra 
2. See, for example, M. Foucault, “La vérité et les formes juridiques”, in Id., Dits et écrits I, 1954-1975, Gallimard, Paris, 2001, 
pp. 1406-1491; Id., Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling. The Function of Avowal in Justice, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2014.
3. M. Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, Vintage Books, New York, 1990, pp. 6-7.
4. About judgment in Foucault, see F. Ewald, “Pour un positivisme critique: Michel Foucault et la philosophie du droit”, 
in Droits, 3, 1986, pp. 137-42. On the above-mentioned points, see G. Brindisi, Potere e giudizio. Giurisdizione e veridizione 
nella genealogia di Michel Foucault, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2010.
5. L. H. Martin, H. Gutman, P. H. Hutton (eds.), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, Tavistock, London, 
1988, p. 13.
6. M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France (1977-1978), Palgrave Macmillan, Hound-
mills, 2007, p. 8. 
7. On this issue, see L. Bazzicalupo, “Governamentalità: pratiche e concetti”, in Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridi-
ca, 43, 2013, pp. 395-414. See also P. Fitzpatrick, B. Golder, Foucault’s Law, Routledge, New York, 2009.
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temporal foundation of a phenomenon but to the strategy, which should be understood 
as the justification for phenomenal changes.
The strategic dimension of technologies emerges in the anti-Hobbesian conception 
of the civil war belonging to Foucault, for which it always works within the established 
power. An example is the constitution, in the 19th century, of a “dangerous class” which 
led to a transformation of legal rationality, because the criminological transcription 
of the crime and the re-codification of moral notions in criminal categories offered to 
power to punish the possibility of its extension to anomalies which were not includ-
ed in the field of punishment. This was one of the uses of imprisonment, a practice 
which has allowed new procedures for objectification of the subject which, in relation 
to the higher ‘describability’ of subjectivity, have not only determined a lowering of the 
threshold of acceptability of punishing and being punished, but also a new awareness of 
judging in relation to the division between normal and abnormal subjects, normal and 
dangerous classes.8
A further constant element of Foucault’s method, which is useful to investigate the 
creation of fields of experience, is the distinction between codes and moral technolo-
gies, in particular developed by his genealogy of ethics, but which may be traced back to 
the analytical scheme formulated in Discipline & Punish in relation to the connection 
between codes, technologies and objects of judgment. The importance of this distinc-
tion may be understood if we analyse the genealogical perspective through which Fou-
cault showed that both the differences between paganism and Christianity, and those 
which are inside Christianity itself, may be understood only if we free ourselves from a 
conception of moral history as a history of codes or behaviours, and recognize in it the 
history of the relations existing between codes and the ways through which the subjects 
establish a relationship with themselves. Foucault distinguishes two Christian regimes 
of truth: a regime that corresponds to the moral code, which is organized around show-
ing one’s own faith and has its basis in the act of submission and obedience, and another 
one that corresponds to moral technology and that is organized around the act and the 
obligation of truth, in the imperative given to the subject to decipher itself in confession 
as a subject of desire.9 It is in this relation between code and moral technology that 
Foucault recognizes an infinite series of compromises and frictions, which constitute 
the most proper characterization of Western moral history, marked by the perennial 
8. On all these subjects see M. Foucault, La société punitive. Cours au Collège de France (1972-1973), Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, 
2012, pp. 23-39. 
9. M. Foucault, On the Government of the Living. Lectures at the Collège de France (1979-1980), Palgrave Macmillan, Hound-
mills, 2014. 
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difficulty in conciliating juridical subject and subject of truth, hermeneutics of the text 
and hermeneutics of the subject, faith as adherence to a dogmatic content and faith 
as performative dire-vrai on one’s self,10 and, in modernity, juridical subject and homo 
criminalis.
Such subjects will find their final definition in The Use of pleasure, where it is fur-
ther specified that prescriptive values and rules are one thing, the real behaviours of 
individuals are another, and the way in which an individual should make himself or 
herself “an ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that make up 
the code”11 is another thing again. Codes, values do not say anything about the ways in 
which they should be performed, elaborated or created, and the moral subject consti-
tutes itself starting from behaviours on the basis of which he or she obligates himself or 
herself in relation to them. The integration of codes and prohibitions within a relation-
ship with oneself is in fact always different, because, even when the code is the same, the 
elements constituting the how of moral experience, that is to say the ethical substances, 
the ways of subjection, the techniques and finally the teloi are always articulated in a 
different way.
Even though they are different in some aspects, we believe that genealogy of ethics 
and genealogy of prison have common methodological elements. In fact, with a more 
careful look, in Discipline & Punish, beside the subject of law, Foucault identifies a se-
ries of punishable objects or subjective matters which constitute in judgment a double 
psychological-moral operating below the code, and it will not be difficult to recognise in 
this a methodological principle which is very similar to that used in The Use of pleasure. 
In relation to the changes in the criminal system at the end of the 18th century, Fou-
cault underlined that, beyond the small changes made to some elements of the code, 
the most important transformation had to do with the object of criminal judgment 
through the creation of a new objectivity.12 What changed it was not the formal defini-
tion of the punishable element, but its quality, its substance: under the name of crime 
not only an object defined by the code, but also a series of anomalies, perversions and 
objects which cannot be qualified juridically but recognisable from a scientific point of 
view, were judged. In short, during modernity the object of judgment is not an act or a 
behaviour, but the way the subject is: judgment needs to know if the crime has already 
been written in the history of the subject, in his/her desire. As it is necessary to justify 
10. M. Foucault, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling. The Function of Avowal in Justice, conferences III, IV and V.
11. M. Foucault, The Use of pleasure, p. 26.
12. M. Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Vintage Books, New York, 1995, p. 17.
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the decision by using psychiatric discursiveness, the judgment sees its own rationality 
threshold changed, as it inserts evaluations in its own device which do not belong to the 
juridical field, but to the describable individuality (and therefore punishable and cor-
rectable) of the disciplinary system. Here we have to record the creation of the modern 
soul, as well as a change in the forms of judicial experience, which may be brought to 
light by the analysis of the way in which codes are made to work through procedures of 
objectification of the subject.
To continue with our line of reasoning on the method, the genealogy of ethics pre-
supposes that the identity of moral code does not imply the identity of the ways in 
which it is possible to be constituted as moral agents, while the genealogy of law presup-
poses that the identity of the criminal code does not imply the identity of the ways in 
which a subject can fall within a criminal action, and being judged and punished. Law 
has a dynamic element which is made by the way in which the punishable matters come 
into play. Besides the subjective matter into which a subject is divided starting from the 
discourses and practices which allow him or her to modify the relationship with himself 
or herself (confession of the crime or confession of who he is), there is therefore to con-
sider the mode of subjection, that is to say all the reasons pushing a subject to recognise 
his or her moral or juridical obligations. The techniques through which we can modify 
ourselves in order to become ethical subjects have their equivalent in the techniques 
which allow the objectification of the subject and make it the object of possible knowl-
edge and behaviour. Finally, there is the fourth element, the telos, the goal towards which 
we aim in a moral behaviour, which finds its correspondence in the aim implied in  the 
punishment of a subject.
 
The re-definitions of “judiciable” between government by judges 
and judicial governance: from the norm to the optimum
What has been said so far allows us to recognize one of the specificities of Fou-
cault’s thought in the analyses of what may be defined as the continuous production 
and re-definition of the “judiciable” as a dimension peculiar to law.13 Such an analysis 
gives us the possibility of grasping the ways through which judgments are organised and 
justified, evaluating the confluence of heterogeneous elements in the judging ‘unit’ and 
13. M. Foucault, “La redéfinition du ‘judiciable’”, in Justice, 115, 1987, pp. 36-39.
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dividing this latter in order to make emerge the conflicts which shake it, the positions of 
value that support it. This will demonstrate what the horizon of rationality of judgments 
is, their origin, the reason for which we believe they are in some way justified. In short, 
it is about analysing the historical re-definitions of objects of judgment and of subjects 
of knowledge and therefore the becoming of the forms of judgment in the more general 
field of the economy of the relations of power. It is in this way that the power of the 
judges performs a function of social regulation, and not simply of creation of new law. It 
is enough to think that, according to Foucault, the expansion of the normative power of 
judges did not have to wait for the crisis of legislation as a regulatory force; in the crim-
inal process, where it is more difficult to deviate from the principle of legality, judging 
is not in fact equivalent to applying legislation. It has been seen since the 19th century 
that law has been open to recognising concepts which were created outside itself, such 
as that of socially dangerousness, which has neither judicial nor medical nature and has 
a function that is substantialistic and individualizing in judgment.
As well known, the phenomena of internationalization and jurisdictionalization of 
law14 determined a new problematization of judgment in relation to multiple phenom-
ena, among which the increased role of judges within contemporary democracies and 
apart from this (lex mercatoria), the role of International and Supranational Courts, and 
finally the dialogue between the Courts of different countries even though there is not 
any obligation in this regard. In this respect we talk about judicial governance, not to be 
confused with the government by judges, because its main characters are the inclusion 
of the private individuals in the decision processes and the action in the absence of the 
legislation.15
We believe that it is possible in the light of Foucault’s analysis to make an attempt 
not only to explain the particular origin of the phenomenon, but to broaden the series 
of problems it gives rise to. These are problems about which Foucault started to think 
during the second half of the 70s, by analysing the dissemination of the judicial func-
tions throughout the whole social body because of his increasing interest for the process 
of governmentalization of contemporary states.
In La redéfinition du “judiciable” Foucault says that the emergence of pluralism 
has forced the state to change regarding to its rationality, founded on the relation 
liberty/law. The basis of the new economy of power relations becomes the judici-
ary. Besides recalling the new functions assigned to judiciary, Foucault underlines the 
14. V. Omaggio, Il diritto nello stato costituzionale, Giappichelli, Torino, 2011, pp. 84-85.
15. M. R. Ferrarese, La governance tra politica e diritto, il Mulino, Bologna, 2010, pp. 121-146.
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presence of judges in new bodies which are not exactly judicial whose functions of 
control within fields previously subtracted from the judicial sphere are multiplied. It 
is enough to think about the Authorities, institutions between the executive and the 
judicial branch having the task of controlling information, privacy, consumption, the 
relations between individuals and administration, etc. The creation of new fields of 
intervention for the judiciary determines a transformation of its rationality because, 
besides defining a division between lawful and unlawful beginning with legislation, 
it will also make further divisions, such as that between truth and falsehood, between 
what is physiologically good and physiologically harmful etc., without a code of refer-
ence. In short, the judicial institution has increasingly a regulatory function. And the 
protection functions have gradually turned not towards the individuals or the species, 
but towards the vulnerable behaviours and in view of the optimum of the social func-
tioning, i.e. towards the protection of population from the pathological distortions of 
the complex system in which we live. The element characterizing the judicial decision 
becomes the establishment of this optimum, that is stated starting from the legislative 
activity which other knowledge exerts within it — what invalidates the Kelsenian par-
adigm of the qualification of facts and marks the belonging of judicial judgment more 
to the sphere of ‘is’ than the sphere of ‘ought’, in an inversion of relations between pre-
scription and reality.16 It is therefore true that liberal governability, which limits itself 
in relation to the naturalness of phenomena (population, market) which it asserts to 
know,17 has progressively purported that it was the judicial field which sets the limits 
to the power and guarantees an effective government. The judge stands, in fact, as the 
holder of a certain number of truths on the optimum of freedom and security for the 
defense of the population against dangers, as the guardian of rights against the power, 
and as a public service to arbitrate the conflicts of a market society. For this Foucault 
has included the functioning of judges in that psychological and cultural correlate of 
liberalism which is the danger.18
This transformation of the ‘judiciable’ constitutes a new agreement between the 
state and citizens: no longer is it the warranty for peace within national frontiers, but 
protection from everything which might be a factor of uncertainty and risk. This has 
been revealed in Foucault’s time, and it is also shown nowadays, threatened by both the 
16. See S. Chignola, “In the shadow of the State. Governance, governamentalità, governo”, in G. Fiaschi (ed.), Governance: oltre 
lo Stato?, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2008, pp. 117-141.
17. M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France (1978-1979), Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, 
2008, pp. 24-25.
18. Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
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terrorist menace and by the fact that protection is a permanent exception regarding 
laws.19
But in reality it is all the mechanics of the order that has been affirmed in the West 
to have led, according to Foucault, to a transformation of the fields of intervention of 
power and of the forms of experience, in virtue of which the extra-legal intervention 
of power is not perceived as an abuse, but as a “thoughtful attention.” As the law can-
not interfere on every occasion in which the woof of daily life is torn apart by a single 
exceptional event, security requires a saving power and authorizes a permanent state of 
exception. Such a state is required by forms of subjectivation that live life as a factor of 
danger, and in neoliberalism also as human capital to put in value, as they have internal-
ized the enterprise form and evaluate (and evaluate themselves) through performance 
parameter. 
In other words, the 19th and the 20th centuries have seen the affirmation in the 
West of an economy of power relations which is not based on the creation of a juridical 
architecture, but on a mechanics of the order20 where also judicial power is introduced. 
We can assume that if today at an international level we talk about global order it is 
because within state systems judges are no longer required to apply laws but to produce 
social order.
Through the consolidation of a disciplinary justice, of a justice for social defence 
having the task of determining, before code violation, an undetermined real danger, 
there is the progressive affirmation of a judge who is the creator of law also having a 
promotional attitude, but most of all there is the transformation of our forms of ex-
perience, of our self-perception of damage and responsibility, which nowadays can be 
potentially extended to everything — also because of the transformations of the consti-
tutional state, of which Carl Schmitt and Ernst Forsthoff have underlined criticalities in 
relation to the bellicose logic of values.
If what we have said is plausible, then we can argue that the loss in the regulatory 
capability of the legislation, the request for security and norms and the fact of acting 
as a substitute for the political are an effect, not a cause, of the increase of the judicial 
‘offer’, that is to say of the ‘decision’ of the West to govern pluralism through re-func-
tionalising of the judicial power. Since modernity, the judicial power has found itself to 
benefit from a certain condition of acceptability and belief, and has found room in a 
logic which has allowed an imitative spreading of it, as Gabriel Tarde would have said, 
19. M. Foucault, La sécurité et l’État, in Id., Dits et écrits, Gallimard, Paris, 1994, III, pp. 383-388.
20. M. Foucault, Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, p. 166.
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up to such a global level which in turn has determined the transformation of the logic 
itself, as we will try to show.
As it is clear, Foucault does not argue on the classical terms of the debate con-
cerning the government by judges (founded on their capacity of creating law or on 
their lack of democratic legitimacy), and obviously he could not predict the global 
transformations of judiciary power, i.e. what is currently called judicial governance. 
Undoubtedly, this is different than the government by judges, not only quantitatively 
(because of the growth of the power and of the cases in which the judges intervene), 
but also qualitatively, because it includes new subjects in the decision process and acts 
in absence of law.
This does not prevent us, however, to use profitably Foucauldian categories to 
reinterpret the government by judges, and to interpret the judicial governance recog-
nizing in it forms of continuity in the perspective of governmentality.21 If in fact we 
attribute to the idea of government a wider semantic spectrum, with Foucault we can 
rewrite the concept of government by judges extending it to the ordinary jurisdiction 
and to the quasi-judicial powers, as these have contributed in production of social or-
der in a complex relationship with other powers, knowledge and forms of normativity 
that have been strategically related. Government by judges and judicial governance 
can then be framed in the common horizon of the judicial governmentality, that is the 
way through which judicial power integrates power technologies and produces social 
order beyond its fundamentals, i.e. legal and constitutional architectures. It is in this 
sense that one can say that the judges and the quasi-judicial powers govern, since they 
have a constituent power and they are able to lead the conducts, omnes et singulatim. 
Cases of Judicial Governmentality
The Global Prominence of Judicial Power
We believe that the above-mentioned problems have taken on such an importance 
as to change the horizons of international rationality. And we can affirm that in a cer-
tain way the logic of the relation between judicial governmentality and global order 
21. On the relationship between governmentality and governance, see S. Vaccaro, “Governança e governamentalidade”, in 
N. Avelino, S. Vaccaro (eds.), Governamentalidade segurança, Intermeios, San Paolo, 2014, pp. 43-58. See also G. Borrelli 
(ed.), Governance, Dante & Descartes, Napoli, 2004.
107
repeats in a different form the relation between judicial power and democracy, as well 
as between judges and law, within national systems. The importance of non-state en-
tities in international relations, and therefore the crisis of international relations for-
malized around states, repeat the emergence of forces and contradictions which have 
determined the transformation of rationality of the modern state. In fact, as the judicial 
power falls within the forms of government of pluralism within state systems, it also 
falls within global governance. Moreover, the deterioration of international legality and 
the absence of the predictability of decisions due to the supremacy of international tri-
bunals in the formulation of criminal norm (as it happens in the ad hoc Courts) repeat 
the deterioration of the principle of legality in state systems. There is, then, another 
reason, which is very elementary: not only we had already a transnational expansion in 
the processes of judicial governmentalization of the national systems (because of the 
phenomena that they intended to govern), but the same governmentality that is based 
on the risk purports to overcome frontiers. 
Remaining on an international level, international judges have also created a new 
category of crimes (crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
created by the Court of Nuremberg), and nowadays they play the role of law-makers 
in the formulation of criminal norm,22 and in this way they create and define forever 
international law, with the risk of a normative confusion also with reference to the 
definition, which is absent, of the function of punishment.23 Making up to Foucault’s 
critique to Hobbes, particularly in the international field the transformations of the 
judiciary are a continuation of war with other means. As it is known, the punishment 
of war criminals in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials was a continuation of the war in 
a juridical form, and such a politicalness is also present in the ITCY. Danilo Zolo has 
shown that the judicial profile of international courts has always been overshadowed 
or by the overlapping of military logic or by an ideological identification of their 
judging and examining members with the values and the expectations of Western 
countries, and has recognized in it a political justice in which the criminal process 
performs extra-judicial functions such as the stigmatization of the enemy or the ex-
piatory sacrifice.24 For these reasons we believe we can subvert, again with Foucault, 
within the international context, the Clausewitz formula, and state that international 
22. A. Esposito, “La définition des crimes et le rôle du droit comparé: comment les juges comblent les lacunes normatives”, 
in E. Fronza, S. Manacorda (eds.), La justice pénale dans les décision des tribunaux ad hoc, Dalloz-Giuffrè, Milano, 2003.
23. R. Henham, “The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing”, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
1, 2003, pp. 64-85.
24. D. Zolo, Invoking Humanity. War, Law and Global Order, Continuum International, London-New York, 2002.
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courts are the continuation of global civil war with other means. The new role of ju-
dicial truth implies a tribunalization not only of politics but of history itself. 
On the other hand, judicial power is also one of the foremost players of suprana-
tional and transnational law. Considering the first aspect, the institutional architecture 
of the European Union was mostly created in a “judicial way” of creation of rules, as is 
attested by the leading role of the European Court of Justice. But see also the European 
Court of Human Rights — where the states can be sued by their own citizens — and its 
consequent repairing role, also starting from its dialogue with foreign courts. As far as 
the transnational law is concerned — leaving apart the transnational judicial dialogue 
which is going to be examined soon —, just remember that on this level judicial power 
is a regulatory actor of commercial relations. Especially in this context a global mar-
ket of law has been constituted, where there is a huge presence of private subjects that 
threatens to turn justice into a private good, serving an efficientist logic. In addition, 
due to the phenomenon of the forum shopping, the consumer of the law becomes the 
arbiter25 — what constitutes a sort of self-regulation. 
And finally, through the Foucauldian point of view, judicial power is one of the fore-
most players of security governance. In fact, the European judicial network is being creat-
ed only after the police network, and even at a global level a world cooperation network 
is being created in view of security against terrorism, without the existence in both cases 
of an European or a global criminal law. Even while recognizing in terrorism itself the 
problem of the security state, Foucault was worried about the fact that we were entering 
a regime in which fear and security increase one another. And also today, just like in the 
19th century, after 9/11 the criminal is equalized to the enemy who fights against society, 
and fear is produced in relation to terrorism so that populations accept the agreement for 
security. Such an agreement has return effects in governing individuals, which use rights 
as an instrument for demands but accept without too many scruples the creation of a 
buffer (dangerous classes, rogue states, clandestine immigrants). As a matter of fact, in 
the domestic context the fight against terrorism is transformed into a selective criminal 
justice, into a war against immigration: the greater biopolitical interest in the life of vul-
nerable population is reflected in a thanato-political interest in the exclusion of danger, 
a sign of which is the current international criminalization of clandestine immigration.26
25. A. Garapon, La Raison du moindre État. Le néolibéralisme et la justice, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2010, pp. 189-196. Also, see D. 
Bifulco, “Il potere giudiziario”, in F. Angelini, M. Benvenuti (eds.), Il diritto costituzionale alla prova della crisi economica, 
Jovene, Napoli, 2012, pp. 359-374.
26. In 2009, for example, an Italian Parliamentary Bill on security wanted to oblige doctors to report clandestine im-
migrants who asked for medical services to the judicial authority. Nowadays in Italy there is an administrativization of 
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Transnational Judicial Dialogue and Knowledge
As it was said before, in the passage from modernity to contemporaneity the opera-
tiveness of the concept of law was neglected in favour of an endless modulation of law 
or of an acting in absence of it. This is what happens in that dialogue which is devel-
oped without a normative context and through more or less informal practices, that is 
to say in the dialogue between Courts of different countries, which might justify their 
decisions beyond the word of the legislator, by using arguments or by citing foreign 
sentences. Recalling foreign sentences or supranational courts strengthens in fact the 
independence of national judges, which is sometimes condemned for its potential abuse 
in relation to sovereign political choices or praised for the extension of the protection 
of human rights.
Now, even though the logic of human rights is pervading, rights as well as values are 
not worth for themselves, but as they are continuously re-evaluated. As a consequence it 
is necessary to be able to look at the practices of power and the technologies which con-
stitute the substratum of values re-evaluation. For this reason, we will try to enunciate 
the problems put by such a practice in relation to the role of values and the knowledges 
which intervene in the global judiciary context.
In fact, the transmigration of values at an international level through judges27 is 
often under discussion but, as it was said, a value is one thing and another is the way 
to make it real. A same principle, a same value, and even a same juridical norm do not 
say anything on their own realization and may be historically defined in different ways, 
because there are forces which give them an interpretation and forms of subjectiviza-
tion which structure themselves through these interpretations. It is therefore necessary 
to see how values are re-evaluated, in relation not only to interpretative techniques of 
judges but also to the way in which knowledges come into play in the definition of the 
objects of judgment. 
Maybe the dialogue between the Courts might be as long as there is a horizon of gov-
ernmental rationality which regards the knowledges which contribute to the definition 
of judgment. If for instance, in a case of end of a life, the Italian Court of Cassation28, 
without decrees by the legislator, could recall the ECHR, the New Jersey Supreme Court, 
judiciary in relation to migrants, with a legal presumption of dangerousness (reversal of its original function of individuali-
zation) in case of judicial denunciation. 
27. See B. Markesinis, J. Fedtke (eds.), Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of Inspiration?, UCL Press, London, 2006.
28. Cort. Cass. Sez I, sent. n. 21748, 16 october 2007.
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the Bundesverfassungsgericht, or the House of Lords, it was because there is an horizon 
of medical knowledge to which the judicial decision is subject, that of reaching an irre-
versible situation recorded according to the current technological possibilities.
The current neoliberal governmentality is on the other hand characterised by a 
constant concern for managing life and human capital, which has modified the same 
knowledge of the psyche. As it has been anticipated, it is referred to the logic of the 
optimum, to the growth of the operating capacities of the subject through the inter-
ference on its behaviors.29 The number of psychopathological entities has multiplied, 
getting to include the field ranging from invalidating psychotic forms to the conditions 
of temporary indisposition. Every behaviour associated with anxious states has become 
potentially risky, and each antisocial, compulsive or aggressive behaviour has become 
prodromic for possible psychopathological evolutions and liable of therapeutical inter-
vention.30 The partition between normal and pathological became therefore less clear 
(continuous update of the DSM), and the change in the direction of a greater fluidity 
of medical forensic discursivenesses is probably one of the reasons why Italian Supreme 
Court31, for example, has recently complied with that of other European countries, rec-
ognizing personality disorders as causes to prevent the imputability of the subject. Dis-
orders of personality, meant as the incapability by the subject to manage his or her own 
capital, became subjective matters which can be judged within the criminal field, with 
the possibility for psychiatry to intervene also at the level of the smallest distortions of 
the behaviour, and with the possibility for the judiciary to extend punishment to ele-
ments which are not included in any criminal code. 
Governmentality and Security
On the criminal policies aspect, it is a progressive development of importance of the 
power technologies and of the predictive knowledge, from the statistic point of view (ac-
tuarial practices)32 and today from the genetic one (homo neuronalis), in order to achieve 
the so-called selective incapacitation and to prevent the social dangerousness. This is the 
dominant function that qualifies the current governmentality. The bio-informatics has 
29. See D. Tarizzo, “Dalla biopolitica all’etopolitica. Foucault e noi”, in Nóema, 4,1, 2013, pp. 47-50. 
30. M. Bertani, “Postfazione”, in M. Foucault, Discipline, poteri, verità, Marietti, Genova-Milano, 2008, p. 258. 
31. See Cort. Cass., Sezioni Unite Penali, sent. n. 9163, 8 march 2005; Cort. Cass., Sez. I, sent. n 16574, 3 may 2005, which 
recalls decisions and legislation of various European countries.
32. See B. E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing in an Actuarial Age, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 2007. 
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already created a new horizon of reality that can transform the way of understanding of 
themselves and others, a new horizon of experience of biological knowledge.33
In this horizon the subject speaks without speaking and is known who he is without 
the verbalization of who he is.34 Nevertheless it is true that this type of discoursivity has 
not arrived yet to dominate judicial opinions, as Nikolas Rose maintains, although this 
biological conception of the person is becoming common-sense, and it will have a great 
value in determining the punishment, starting from the principle of the protection of 
society, as Rose himself argues.35 So if you think about the current passage from the 
homo psichologicus to the homo neuronalis which is shaping the new techniques devel-
oped by predictive medicine, that can attribute the deviancy to a genetic or neuropsy-
chological deficit, and if you think about their extension to the criminal field, it will not 
be difficult to imagine a dangerous society of control which will totally re-define our 
games on the truth and the false.
Through this new technological horizon, justice is inserted in an economy of power 
based on control, considering also the importance assumed by electronic surveillance, 
which has the task to identify and track the individuals, or the big data profiling activity, 
which proceeds in direction of a preventive surveillance.
Theoretically, it cannot be excluded that these technologies can determine a new 
evidence of punishment and a function exclusively regulating the justice,36 except that 
imprisonment is increasing all over the Western world.
It can be observed, however, that, as the disciplinary technologies were designed to 
transform life into labor force and they posed an equivalence between form-prison and 
form-salary, today’s technologies of the controlled society have the task of optimizing 
work performance through the control and they establish a regime of truth and power 
in which to the financial flow corresponds the traceability of the individual, just like the 
goods. It is not about only to withdraw the time from the subject and to discipline him, 
but to make him circulate in the most efficient way, marking out his route. Though there 
is a qualitative transformation of the regime of power and truth which has determined 
new forms of subjectivity, it remains the function of management and differentiation of 
the ‘illegalisms’ belonging to all the aforementioned technologies. 
33. See F. Ewald, Assurance, prevention, prediction… dans l’univers du Big Data, Rapport pour l’Institute Montparnasse, 
Paris, 2012, p. 67.
34. In a different sense, even the utopia of the inquiry has stopped to rely on the word of the subject, turning to a confession 
of things. See G. Wajcman, Les expert. La police des morts, Puf, Paris, 2012.
35. N. Rose, The Politics of Life Itself. Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2007, pp. 234-235. See also K. Veitch, The Jurisdiction of Medical Law, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2013. 
36. See V. Gautron, J.-N. Retière, Le traitement pénal aujourd’hui: juger ou gérer?, in Droit et Société, 88, 2014, pp. 579-590.
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Cultural Governance
Another aspect of judicial governmentality which is worth mentioning due to its 
effects of power and knowledge is related to the governance of cultural differences and 
to the judicial multiculturalism. Despite the judicial practices which recognize the value 
of the cultural defense have an overall rationality, the judicial space shows that the unity 
of legal orders has weakened, and that the judges have become actors of the cultural 
mediation. If it is possible to recognize in the process a form of heterotopia (i.e. a space 
where a plurality of different spaces, times, knowledge and powers are represented), 
and if one adopts an irenic image of judicial multiculturalism, it would be affirmed that 
into the judicial space the plurality of the world can find expression and composition. 
Nevertheless, not the best expressions in each culture are being compared in the judicial 
heterotopy, but the more problematic: singular practices, suffering voices, lives dragged 
under the gaze of the judge, in a game of power.
Now that the cultural sphere has become a judgeable subjective matter, the judges may 
get to establish what is culture and what is not. But behind every description of a culture 
hides a judgment on that same culture, a judgment that defines, as Pierre Bourdieu could 
say, the legitimate form of that culture, consequently producing numerous exclusions. 
The recognition of the legitimacy of a cultural practice contributes to determine the per-
ception of self and others (especially in relation to the position of the non-citizens that 
count for nothing in the legitimate political field), and it constitutes the misrecognition, 
the negation — in the Freudian sense — of its arbitrary. In this context, the judge is a po-
litical actor of primary importance as he can achieve progressive or regressive, identitary 
or differential policies, according to the optimum of the social functioning. 
Furthermore, as several scholars have shown, the reason that leads many judges to 
recognize the validity of the cultural argument in culturally motivated crimes is not the 
perception of diversity as a public good, but the belief that the subject has acted un-
der the pressure of uncontrollable cultural inputs that have reduced its consciousness.37 
And for this reason, it is claimed that it is necessary to integrate the psychological and 
anthropological knowledge. So, it is not a coincidence that the anthropological expertise 
asks the subject to tell the truth about himself, to give an account of his biography.
The activity of partage of the judge risks therefore to favor management practices 
of the population, because his decision may be part of a political practice of integration 
37. I. Ruggiu, Il giudice antropologo, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2012, p. 201.
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that manages movements of good and bad diversity.38 And the legitimation of cultural 
profiling induces the danger of the inferiorization of a culture and gives legal value to an 
imaginary construction of the other as guilty in his own way of being.
Conclusions
On the light of the above, judicial governmentality is part of a global governmen-
talization process and it performs its primary task of government of flows through a 
selective activity directed towards the definition of the social optimum, in relation to 
the criminality, to the market, to the rights, to the relationship between cultures etc. 
The judiciary works in an heterogeneous logic which does not turn into homogeneity,39 
according to the lines of privatization (forum shopping, arbitration), administration 
(authorities), constitutionalization (national, supranational and international courts) 
and expertization of judgment.
And especially this last line in the Foucault’s point of view assumes a great impor-
tance. The judicial judgment interacts indeed strategically with operating knowledge 
which has no longer the function to tell the rule, but to say the optimum and to opti-
mize the performances (of the state, of the individual, etc.). In both cases, the scientific 
knowledge doubles the object of justice and gives it a new form of reality. This fact 
modifies the comprehension of ourselves and others: if in disciplinary society the sub-
ject evaluates and evaluated itself through the grid of intelligibility of the norm, today 
it does so through the grid of intelligibility of the optimum. In this way, it goes from a 
judgment of normality and a form of interiority based on the norm to an optimization 
judgment and a form of interiority based on the enterprise, which will lead to the stig-
matization not of the abnormals, but of those who “will not, for whatever reason, adopt 
an active, informed, positive, and prudent relation to the future”.40
This contamination with knowledge stands like the foundation of the truth of the 
judgment, and hides the politicalness of the decision, as well as of the truth. Although 
the knowledge makes apparent the datum of the world as natural, we know that the 
datum is always produced by a certain treatment, and that the perception is always 
38. A. Lentin, G. Titley, The Crises of Multiculturalism. Racism in a Neoliberal Age, Zed, London, 2011. See also S. Mezzadra, 
B. Neilson, Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor, Duke University Press, Durham, 2013.
39. A. Tucci, “(Dis)aggregazioni”, in A. Tucci (ed.), Disaggregazioni. Forme e spazi di governance, Mimesis, Milano-Udine, 
2013, p. 11.
40. N. Rose, The Politics of Life Itself, p. 25.
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prejudiced by the configuration of knowledge and power in which it is located. The 
problem is not therefore the dialogue among judges, the realization of values or the 
normativity of knowledge, but the belief that their articulation can be performed in 
only but one way, which is deemed as correct and true, which will no longer be one of 
the many possible ways of what is possible, but a need. There is, indeed, a strong risk 
that judicial governmentality depends on the determinations of economical, medical, 
psychological and neurological knowledges and practices, and in general from the 
efficientist downhill which is overcoming the public sphere. The fact that our judicial 
systems go towards an increasing individualization of judgments and punishments 
should ask for an effort of elaboration which is able to bring it about or at least to 
problematizing what has been consolidated in common sense, that is to say the exper-
tising as the result of our moral history. The pervasive becoming of judicial functions 
creates the possibility to express evaluations which cannot be controlled and are the 
seed of a new possible judicial abuse to which it is possible to react only promoting a 
new judicial question like the one of the Enlightenment. 
If Foucault could appeal the universal form of the law and wish a new Beccaria, this 
form of problematization does not appear so important in the global world, though not 
in relation to the criminal policies of the states. Precisely because judicial governance is 
part of a larger phenomenon of governamentalization of the law, then it is on this field 
that one has to react. In a society like ours, the law should protect not only what we are, 
but also the effort to be different from what we are. In this sense, the struggle for rights 
has to take place by imposing a right of the governed41 to the judicial governmentality, 
and, in any case, new ways to realize a global legality.42
41. See S. Chignola (ed.), Il diritto del comune. Crisi della sovranità, proprietà e nuovi poteri costituenti, Ombre Corte, Ve-
rona, 2012.
42. See G. Palombella, È possibile una legalità globale? Il Rule of Law e la governance globale, il Mulino, Bologna, 2012.
